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3 June 1970

## TALKING PAPER: THE CHINA INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

The following remarks briefly outline: (a) my principal China Intelligence Activities Coordinator (CIAC) efforts to date; (b) certain continuing China intelligence needs; and (c) my recommendation concerning the future of the CIAC role.

## A. CIAC EFFORTS TO DATE

These efforts for the most part have been purposely individual-to-individual and office-to-office, with only occasional plenaries. I think the undertaking has been modestly useful in a number of respects. The following examples illustrate some of the range of this utility infielding:

1. Attempts to define the China threat more precisely, so that China intelligence input may have more direct purpose. To this end:


a. Initial conversations with Agency, State, NSC Staff, and Defense officers.

b. Thereafter, preparation of my own substantive evaluation of the China threat and of the ability of US intelligence to answer this and that question. Subsequent use of these findings as propositions for further discussion and refinement.

c. Attempts to ferret out JCS China threat evaluations.

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2. Report to DCI on the state of the intelligence effort against the Chinese Communist advanced weapons (CCAW) problem. The preparing of this report gave CIAC and DCI a unique overview of a complex and major intelligence problem field, and revealed certain areas where refinement of existing US intelligence efforts could yield benefits within existing budgets and priorities.



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4. Services for PFIAB:

a. Fielding, by our CIAC plenary, of a broad series of PFIAB questions concerning US collection capabilities, the value of this and that China intelligence gathered, etc.

b. Ad hoc fielding of occasional special questions from PFIAB (and NSC Staff).

c. Discussions with General Maxwell Taylor, Mr. Lincoln, and the PFIAB China Panel on CCAW questions (together with Carl Duckett and Bruce Clarke).

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5. Services for ACDA's General Advisory Committee.

a. Briefed the GAC (officially) on CCAW, the GAC's first such exposure to China; and gave the GAC my personal views on Chinese strategy (together with

[REDACTED]

b. Assisted the GAC's staff in arranging for testimony of certain Washington principals on various questions relating to SALT.

6. In plenary, preparation of first study for USIB concerning strategic warning (China). We expect to have this study ready for USIB consideration in July 1970.

7. Spring and summer 1969, alerted the CIAC Group, in plenary sessions, to Sino-Soviet military developments and to questions of US intelligence capability to monitor possible future Chinese-Russian hostilities.

8. Adjudicated China squabble within DDI. At the request of R. J. Smith and with the O.K. of Mr. Bross, investigated differences between OCI and SRS, gently banged some heads, and gave assessment and certain recommendations to the DDI. Both OCI and SRS have since conducted themselves in a more seemly manner.

9. Informal substantive input to China NIE's, on various occasions, at Headquarters and at the ONE Consultants' Meeting at Iso.

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11. Informal substantive input to DOD (Systems Analysis) China military studies.

12. Various efforts to bring consumers and collectors more closely together. A number of instances on an individual basis, plus organizing an evening China Smoker.

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C. THE FUTURE OF THE CIAC FUNCTION

40. All-in-all, this five-year effort has been worthwhile in that it has provided an unique overview, unencumbered by parochialism, to a key area long recognized as important -- but thin. A case might be made for a similar Arab/Israeli function, though not Soviet or Southeast Asia.

41. Probably only modest refinements and improvements should be expected from any China coordinating role in the near future, given existing budgets, (Soviet) priorities, and the noli me tangere of most operating offices. Nonetheless, some continuing ad hoc CIAC function would seem worthwhile.


42. In my view, the CIAC function is not a full-time one, but is about right as one of other cognate responsibilities, as in the case of [REDACTED] 1965-1968. My according recommendation is:

a. That the present CIAC continue to perform such duties on a lessened, ad hoc basis, for the DCI/NIPE and the DD/I, from a Chief/SRS position. Care would be necessary to prevent awkwardness in lines of responsibility, but I think this would be manageable.

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China Intelligence Activities Coordinator

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